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Abstract
This paper investigates the exploitation of environmental resources in a grow
ing economy within a second-best ﬁscal policy framework. Agents derive utility
from two types of consumption goods — one which relies on an environmental
input and one which does not — as well as from leisure and from environmental
amenity values. Property rights for the environmental resource are potentially
incomplete. We connect second best policy to essential components of utility
by considering the elasticity of substitution among each of the four utility argu
ments. The results illustrate potentially important relationships between envi
ronmental amenity values and leisure. When amenity values are complementary
with leisure, for instance when environmental amenities are used for recreation,
optimal taxes on dirty goods generally increase over time. On the other hand,
optimal taxes on dirty goods generally decrease over time when leisure and en
vironmental amenity values are substitutes. Under some parameterizations,
complex dynamics leading to non-monotonic time paths can emerge.
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Introduction

The eﬃcient design of ﬁscal policies that encompass the provision of environmental
resources is a subject of growing importance. In many cases, the formulation of gov
ernment environmental policy is set in the context of economic growth and can lead
to optimal ﬁscal policies that evolve over time as growth occurs. Often, these policies
move in one direction over time, either always increasing or always decreasing, as
the forces that impact policy move in the same direction as growth occurs. However,
sometimes these dynamic policies exhibit non-monotonic behavior in which policies
move in one direction for a period of time, only to be reversed and move in an oppo
site direction. Perhaps the best known example is the Environmental Kuznets Curve
(EKC), where research has provided several explanations for why various types of
pollution are frequently observed to follow a non-monotonic path of rising pollution
during early stages of economic development followed by subsequent declines at later
stages.1 Other notable examples include ﬁshery and forest management practices
in which periods of rapid resource depletion are followed by periods of dramatically
reduced harvests and resource recovery with subsequently moderated harvesting prac
tises. It is also common for local community growth policies to provide initial tax
incentives to ﬁrms migrating into a community and then later repeal them.
In this paper we investigate optimal tax policy in situations with economic growth
and a ﬁxed natural resource stock. Our primary aim is to consider how a planner
armed with second best tax tools would formulate policy so as to allocate this ﬁxed
stock of environmental resource to competing production and leisure activities. To ﬁx
these ideas, consider a tract of undeveloped land that can be allocated to production
or to recreation, for instance the U.S. Arctic National Wildlife Preserve, and the opti
mal tax treatment of products such as gasoline and diesel fuel that rely on extractive
uses of the resource. The key elements of the analysis are the “dirty” good (reﬁned
petroleum extracted from a wildlife preserve), an alternative “clean” good (alterna
1

For a recent review of the EKC literature, see Dasgupta et al. (2002).

tive energy sources), and environmental amenity values arising from preservation of
the resource in a natural state (“use” and “non-use” values associated with wildlife
preservation). Our analysis reveals that the optimal tax treatment of the dirty good
depends on the degree of substitutability between the dirty good and the clean good,
as well as the degree of substitutability between environmental amenity values and
leisure (e.g., the ability to access a wildlife preserve for recreational uses).

These

elasticities allow us to identify when the various substitution patterns between goods,
leisure, and environmental amenity values produce monotonic and non-monotonic
patterns for optimal taxes over time.
We frame our analysis around a Ramsey (1927) model of optimal ﬁscal policy.
This Ramsey approach was extended by Sandmo (1975) and Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1994) to situations with externalities and is the foundation for evaluating
optimal policy in static, second-best settings with non-market goods.2

As interest

has grown in understanding the connection between economic growth and the en
vironment, there is an increasing need to adapt these static optimal tax concepts
into dynamic settings.3

This paper makes such a connection by applying numeri

cal techniques for optimal tax policy pioneered in the macroeconomics literature to
evaluate the implications of various elasticities of substitution in an economy with
environmental resources.4
Our analysis is framed around four essential determinants of consumer utility:
two types of consumption goods —one which relies on an environmental input and one
which does not— leisure, and environmental amenity value. All production goods are
2

For surveys of this literature, see Poterba (1993), Auerbach and Hines (2001), and Bovenberg
and Goulder (2002).
3
Examples of dynamic models that consider second-best tax policy with environmental exter
nalities include Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1993), Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996),
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1997) and Cassou and Hamilton (2005).
4
One interesting feature of the application here is that these techniques had to be adapted to
handle multiple consumption goods. A common assumption in most macroeconomic applications
of dynamic optimal taxation is that a single representative good is consumed at each date. This
is the case in Lucas and Stokey (1983), Judd (1985, 1999), Chamley (1986), Zhu (1992), Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), Cassou and Lansing (1998,
2006) Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppälä (2002) and Gorostiaga (2003, 2005). In this case, the
tax rate on all consumption goods available at a particular date are implicitly equal.

elastically supplied, so that taxes are always distortionary, and our focus is on how
the second-best optimal tax policy evolves over time as growth alters the magnitude
of the various distortions in the economy. Our main ﬁnding is that optimal tax policy
in a growing economy involves distinct dynamic patterns that depend on the degree
in which the various utility arguments substitute for one another. Furthermore, the
degree to which these goods substitute is inﬂuenced by the tension between the use
of environmental resources as an input in goods production and in the generation of
amenity values, and the extent to which the amenity values are fully internalized in
markets. We identify two main forces which cause the magnitude of environmental
externalities, and hence the required extent of corrective taxation, to trend over time.
These include the degree to which environmental amenity values are complementary
with leisure and the degree to which dirty goods are complementary with clean goods.
The intuition for changes in the dynamic pattern of corrective taxes on environ
mental goods is as follows. In a growing economy, economic growth raises eﬀective
leisure. This means the corrective role for tax policy depends on whether increments
in leisure raise or lower the demand for environmental amenities.

When amenity

values are highly complementary with eﬀective leisure activities, the growth of ef
fective leisure time facilitates consumer demand for amenities, increasing the need
for corrective taxes that encourage environmental protection. The opposite is true
when amenity values substitute for eﬀective leisure, for instance if consumers enjoy
spending their leisure time on the internet, as opposed to recreating outdoors. In the
latter case, economic growth increases eﬀective leisure, allowing greater substitution
for amenity. Because of the reduced need for amenity, natural resources become in
creasing used in dirty good production, for instance printer paper, and the optimal
planner facilitates this conversion by reducing taxes on dirty goods.
The degree to which dirty goods are complementary with clean goods also impacts
the optimal tax policy. When dirty goods are more complementary (substitutable)
with clean goods the optimal tax on dirty goods decreases (increases) over time.5
5

This corroborates the ﬁnding of Lopez (1994), who demonstrates that optimal environmental

These relationships arise because economic growth raises the amount of consumption
goods that can be produced from a given level of inputs. When the dirty and clean
goods are complementary, consumption levels increase with growth and the dirty good
tax adjusts downward to encourage its production which would otherwise be inhibited
because of the ﬁxed natural resource factor of production. When the consumption
goods are substitutes, the growing capability of the economy to produce clean goods
reduces the social value of environmental resources in production, and this facilitates
increasing taxes on dirty goods over time. For instance, if electronic ﬁles and paper
ﬁles are highly substitutable, then economic growth should lead to higher taxes on
paper products over time.
Our analysis also reveals that complex dynamics can emerge, including nonmonotonic relationships in the dynamic tax proﬁle. These non-monotonic time paths
tend to arise in situations where there is a high degree of substitutability among the
utility arguments. Under these circumstances, for instance when leisure substitutes
for forestland amenities at the same time that electronic ﬁles substitute for paper,
the productive and consumptive margins for the environment evolve in common di
rections with economic growth.

Dynamic reversals tend to require high degrees

of substitution between goods, because substitution possibilities raise the likelihood
that policy can produce large swings in the desired consumption allocations as the
economy grows. These large swings in desired consumption allocations, in turn, can
result in non-monotonic time paths for the optimal second-best tax policy variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.

Section 2 presents the

competitive economy and the Ramsey planner’s problem. Because of the intractable
nature of the model presented here, simulation techniques are used to study policy.
These simulations are based on a model calibration described in Section 3.

In

Section 4, results of the numerical Ramsey solutions are presented and some general
statements are derived about the inﬂuence of utility valuations on optimal policy.
taxes should rise over time when polluting and non-polluting inputs are substitutes in a single
production process.

2

The Model

The objective of the paper is to understand how optimal second best tax policy
evolves in a growing economy with a ﬁxed natural resource and a rich set of consumer
utility arguments. Because economic growth changes the marginal valuation of the
environmental resource in its alternative uses, the corrective role for taxation changes
over time and these changes are impacted not only by activities that make use of the
natural resource, but also activities that substitute or complement natural resource
usage. To couch these issues in a reasonably transparent model, we pursue a structure
in which environmental resources are converted into ﬁnal goods through a process of
exogenous (and neutral) technological progress.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe the growth process through which productive
inputs change over time.

Next, we focus on the details of the economy which is

comprised of a production sector, a consumer sector, and a government sector. We
consider each of these sectors in turn before formalizing the Ramsey problem at the
end of this section.

2.1

Productive resources

We abstract from population growth and focus only on growth arising from techno
logical progress. Let At and kt denote the technology level and the capital to labor
ratio in the economy at time t. Technology and the capital-labor ratio are assumed
to grow exogenously according to
At = (1 + q)At−1

for t ≥ 0,

(1)

kt = (1 + q)kt−1

for t ≥ 0,

(2)

and

where q, the rate of technical change, proportionally inﬂuences productivity growth
and the growth rate in the capital to labor ratio. Such would be the outcome under
balanced growth.

Productive resources are allocated across two production sectors, a dirty sector,
which makes use of an environmental resource, and a clean sector that produces goods
without relying on use of the environmental resource. We focus on a ﬁxed stock of
the environmental resource, for instance a tract of land that can be allocated either
to production in the dirty sector or to open space. We denote this ﬁxed stock by d
units, of which d1,t are the number of units allocated toward dirty sector production
at time t and d2,t = d − d1,t are left in a natural state. We assume that units of the
resource left in a natural state generate amenity values that contribute to consumer
utility, whereas units devoted to goods-production do not.

2.2

The production sectors

Manufactured goods are produced in two production sectors. We index the producers
by j and distinguish them by j = d, h, where d denotes the producers which makes
use of environmental resources and we refer to as dirty producers and h denotes the
producers which do not and we refer to as the clean producers.

Let yj,t , kj,t and

lj,t denote output, capital input and labor input into sector j at time t.

In each

sector, output is created through the employment of physical capital, labor and land
according to
α−η
η
yd,t = A1d kd,t
(At ld,t ) (1−α) d1,t
for t ≥ 0,

(3)

and
α
yh,t = A1h kh,t
(At lh,t ) (1−α)

for

t ≥ 0,

(4)

where parameters are restricted according to 0 < A1j for j = d, h, α ∈ (0, 1) and
0 < η < α.

For simplicity we assume the production functions (3) and (4) are

associated with symmetric factor shares for labor inputs and that each experiences
the same rate of technological progress as governed by At in equation (1). Produc
tivity growth does not bias the economy towards either one of the two productive
sectors, although sectoral productive capabilities may diﬀer inherently according to
the sectorial coeﬃcients (A1d 6= A1h ).

Each agent in the economy begins at time t = 0 with a homogeneous endowment
of land which they keep for the rest of time and an equal amount of capital k0
which evolves over time according to (2).

Capital, labor and land resources are

assumed to be freely mobile. At each date, productive resources are allocated across
sectors towards their highest return. This implicitly assumes that the allocation of
the environmental resource between production and its natural state is a reversible
decision. In equilibrium, resource mobility has the eﬀect of equating returns across
activities, so that
yd,t
yh,t
= ph,t α
for t ≥ 0,
kd,t
kh,t
yd,t
yh,t
= pd,t (1 − α)
= ph,t (1 − α)
for t ≥ 0,
ld,t
lh,t

rt = rd,t = rh,t = pd,t (α − η)

(5)

wt = wd,t = wh,t

(6)

and
vt = pd,t η

yd,t
for t ≥ 0,
dd,t

(7)

where rt , wt and vt denote the market capital rental rate, market wage rate and
market environmental resource rental rate at time t and pj,t denotes the price of
output in sector j = d, h, at time t.

We choose good h as the numeraire, so that

ph,t = 1.

2.3

The consumer sector

The private sector consists of many identical, inﬁnitely-lived agents who provide
capital, labor and land to the corporate sector in exchange for income used to pur
chase consumption goods.

The representative agent acquires instantaneous utility

at time t through the consumption of dirty goods, cd,t , clean goods, ch,t , time de
voted to leisure, (1 − lt ), and the amount of the environmental resource devoted to
the production of amenity, at , through “visitation,” where the amenity value of the
environmental resource is related to the quantity of the environmental resource set
aside from production, d2,t = d − d1,t , as described below. The utility function takes
the CES form,

∞
X
t=0

´1
³
θ
,
β t ε1 cθt + (1 − ε1 )bθt

(8)

where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor,
1

ψ ψ
ct = (ε2 cψ
d,t + (1 − ε2 )ch,t ) ,

(9)

is a composite consumption good, and
1

bt = (ε3 aσt + (1 − ε3 ) [At (1 − lt )]σ ) σ ,

(10)

is an amenity-leisure composite. The share weights are restricted so that 0 < εi < 1
for i = 1, 2, 3, and the elasticity parameters are restricted according to θ ≤ 1, ψ ≤ 1
and σ ≤ 1.

The elasticity parameters are related to the elasticity of substitution

between the consumption aggregate ct and the amenity-leisure aggregate bt , 1/(1− θ),
the elasticity of substitution between the consumption levels ch,t and cd,t , 1/(1 − ψ),
and the elasticity of substitution between the amenity at and leisure At (1− lt ), 1/(1−
σ).6 Positive values of φ, ψ and σ arise for substitutes and negative values arise for
complementary goods.

The utility formulation in (8) exhibits intertemporal time

separability as is commonly assumed in dynamic models; however, when θ < 1,
ψ < 1 and σ < 1 (the usual case), the utility function does not exhibit temporal
separability. As we show below, when utility does not exhibit temporal separability,
optimal taxes exhibit dynamic behavior.
Amenity value arising from the quantity of the environmental resource set aside
from production is allowed to have common property aspects, which reﬂects poten
tially incomplete property rights. Speciﬁcally,
1−γ

γ
at = d2,t
d2,t ,

(11)

where d2,t is the uninternalized value of the resource amenity, and 0 < γ ≤ 1 repre
sents the extent of property rights. When γ −→ 0, the amount of the environmental
6
Note, lt =
6 1, since lt is used to denote the portion of the total time endowment spent working
and 1 − lt is used to denote the total time spent in leisure. Notice also that the value of time in
leisure grows at the same rate as the value of time in production. This is a common structure used to
ensure balanced growth in models that do not include natural resources. The implicit assumption
is that technological advances that improve the production of goods (e.g., “ﬁsh ﬁnders”) lead to
proportional advances in home production techniques (e.g., recreational ﬁshing).

resource an individual sets aside from production contributes negligibly to aggre
gate utility (a common property resource), whereas when γ = 1 each individual is
fully compensated for the amenity value associated with ownership of an undisturbed
environmental resource. It is assumed in equilibrium that d2,t = d2,t .
Consumers face a budget constraint given by
X

(1 + τ j,t )pj,t cj,t =

j=d,h

X

rj,t kj,t +

j=d,h

X

j=d,h

wj,t lj,t + vt d1,t , for t ≥ 0,

(12)

where the right hand side indicates income earned at time t through the provision of
inputs to the corporate sector and the left hand side indicates expenditures at time
t on consumption goods. Consumers take the consumption tax on good j at time t,
τ j,t , as exogenously chosen by the government.
We consider cases in which the government is unable to tax the externality di
rectly.

Instead, we consider environmental policy as being implemented indirectly

through diﬀerences in the sectoral tax rates on clean and dirty goods, where the dif
ference τ d,t −τ h,t corresponds to a corrective tax on dirty goods in the usual Pigouvian
sense.

2.4

The government sector

The government engages in two types of activities. First, the government purchases
goods from sector j at time t at a level denoted by gj,t ≥ 0.
are assumed to be nonproductive.

These purchases

Second, the government chooses a tax policy

which serves both to raise revenue for ﬁnancing its expenditures and to correct the
externality in amenity formulation that arises when γ =
6 1.

The tax instruments

available for this purpose consist of a consumption tax on each of the two goods,
denoted by τ j,t for j = d, h, where a negative value for a tax may be interpreted as a
subsidy.

We assume the government runs a balanced budget at each date given by,
X

j=d,h

pj,t gj,t =

X

j=d,h

τ j,t pj,t cj,t , for t ≥ 0.

(13)

It is assumed that nonproductive government spending grows in proportion to
P
P
the total level of output according to j=d,h pj,t gj,t = φ j=d,h pj,t yj,t , where φ ≥ 0.

Under this restriction, spending remains a constant share of output over time in which
the share, φ, can be thought of as being decided in an exogenous political process.7
If φ = 0, then taxes serve a purely corrective role.

2.5

Competitive equilibrium

A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of prices, allocations and gov
ernment policy variables such that agents behave optimally as described above, the
government satisﬁes its budget constraints and the following market clearing condi
tions hold. The input market clearance conditions require that capital across sectors
adds up to the total capital stock,
kt =

X

kj,t

j=d,h

for t ≥ 0,

(14)

the total time allocation adds up to the total time available,
lt =

X

lj,t

j=d,h

for t ≥ 0,

(15)

and the natural resource allocation adds up to d,
d=

X

i=1,2

di,t

for t ≥ 0.

(16)

In addition to the input markets, the output good markets clear when
cj,t + gj,t = yj,t for j = d, h and t ≥ 0.

2.6

The Ramsey planner

Optimal policy is described by the actions of a Ramsey planner who wishes to max
imize consumer utility subject to the economy being in a competitive equilibrium.
Because the capital stock grows exogenously and the government runs a balanced
budget, the Ramsey planning problem in itself has no intertemporal consequences.
The optimal second-best tax problem therefore reduces to a sequence of temporal
optimization problems. Despite this simpliﬁcation, however, the utility function is
7

Alternatively, it is possible to interpret φ as an administrative loss parameter.

still suﬃciently complicated that closed form expressions do not arise for the demand
equations. As a consequence, we solve the planner’s problem numerically.

3

Baseline Calibration

For the baseline calibration of the model, both goods-producing sectors of the econ
omy are assumed to be equally productive, A1d = A1h = 1.

Next, since roughly

sixty percent of output in industrial nations is used to pay labor inputs, we select
α = 0.4, a value widely used in macroeconomic studies.

The output elasticity of

the environmental resource in dirty goods production, η, is not a widely calibrated
parameter in other studies. For our analysis, we use a value of η = 0.1 which is the
midpoint of the feasible range of [0,0.2].8
One of the main objectives of this study is to investigate how optimal policy varies
with the degree to which utility arguments are substitutable or complementary. For
the baseline case, all of these parameters are set to ψ = θ = σ = −0.1, a value close
to the natural log preference value of 0.

We assume that environmental property

rights are not fully internalized and use a value of γ = 0.5, which is the midpoint of
the feasible range of (0,1).

The weights in the utility function are chosen in part

to obtain a labor supply equal to one third of the time endowment, a widely used
calibration point.

With this objective, ε2 = 0.5 is selected to place equal weights

on dirty and clean goods, while ε1 = 0.4 and ε3 = 0.1 ensures that the labor supply
allocation remained at one third of the time endowment.
We chose a government consumption rate of twenty percent of output, φ = 0.2,
which is the approximate value observed in the U.S. We also assume that government
spending in each sector is equal to this aggregate share so that

gd
yd

=

gh
yh

= 0.2.

Finally, we set d = 100, k0 = 5 and A0 = 1. This allows us to consider situations
where natural resources are relatively plentiful, where by relatively plentiful we mean
that environmental resources are in relatively greater supply than the physical capital
8

The upper limit of this feasible range is chosen such that the implied capital elasticity is equal
to the natural resource elasticity. Values of η beyond this limit seem unreasonable as they would
imply natural resources as more productive than capital.

stock (i.e., d = 100 and k0 = 5), as well as situations in which they are in relatively less
abundance, where by relatively less abundant we mean that environmental resources
are in relatively lesser supply than physical capital (i.e., when k passes d = 100). We
refer to situations in which resources are relatively plentiful as less developed periods
which occur during the initial dates of our simulations and to situations in which
they are less abundant as developed periods which occur during later dates of our
simulations when the capital stock has grown larger than the natural resource stock.

4

Policy Implications

This section presents the optimal policy results. The results are organized into three
subsections in order to provide greater clarity.

The ﬁrst subsection discusses the

dynamic aspects of ﬁscal policy in a growing economy. Here results of the Ramsey
planning outcome are plotted for an exogenously growing capital stock under vari
ous degrees of substitution between arguments in the utility function. This analysis
provides intuition into how each parameter impacts optimal tax policy. Of primary
interest is how the dynamic optimal tax proﬁle is impacted by diﬀerent values for
the elasticity of substitution between leisure and resource amenities, σ, and diﬀer
ent values for the elasticity of substitution between dirty goods and clean goods,
ψ. The second subsection extends the analysis to show that situations in which
non-monotonic policy behavior can arise under certain speciﬁcations for the utility
elasticities. Finally, the last subsection develops an application of the model to local
community growth incentives, a context in which non-monotonic policy is commonly
observed.

4.1

Utility elasticities and dynamic optimal policy

Here we investigate how the three utility elasticity parameters impact tax policy in a
developing economy. We do this by exploring how incremental changes in the value
of the utility elasticity parameters, σ, ψ and θ change the time path for optimal taxes.
These results are summarized by the pattern of optimal dynamic tax rates in Figures

1-3. In these ﬁgures we have adopted the convention of plotting the capital stock k,
rather than time t, along the horizontal axis.

Since capital grows at the constant

rate given by (2), we see that k could be transformed into t and time plotted instead.
We chose to plot k in order to highlight some intuition in our discussion below for
when turning points in dynamic tax policy arise.9
To understand the policy role of the Ramsey planner, notice that the baseline
value of γ = 0.5 implies incomplete property rights over environmental resources
devoted to amenity production.
in the economy.

Absent policy, amenity values are undersupplied

Accordingly, the Ramsey planner desires to increase the supply

of environmental resources allocated to amenity services and decrease the supply of
environmental resources devoted to the production of dirty goods. This corrective
role of taxes implies that the Ramsey planner selects a higher tax on the dirty good
than on the clean good.
Next, consider the dynamic aspects of policy as the economy grows.

As eco

nomic growth takes place, the capital stock and the eﬀective labor supply increase
over time, but the level of the environmental resource remains ﬁxed at d = 100.
Consequently, the value of the environmental resource in dirty production is bid up
over time. Balancing this eﬀect is the increase in amenity value of the environmen
tal resource because of its connection to eﬀective leisure which is also growing. The
optimal allocation of the environmental resource is determined by the interaction of
these competing interests. The dynamic nature of optimal tax policy is thus inﬂu
enced by the degree to which the alternative uses of the environmental resource are
complementary or substitutable with other arguments in the utility function.
Figure 1 plots the optimal dynamic tax proﬁle for diﬀerent degrees of complemen
tarity between amenity values and leisure, σ. Notice in Figure 1a that when amenity
values are more complementary with leisure, the optimal tax on dirty goods increases
over time, while the opposite occurs when amenity values substitute for leisure. In
9

One could also interpret these exercises as illustrating how taxes respond to capital levels in a
static setting.

the case of complementary values, a rise in eﬀective leisure over time facilitates con
sumer demand for amenities, and the amenity value of environmental resources goes
up more quickly than the value of environmental resources in dirty good production.
The planner responds by steering resources away from dirty good production and
towards use in amenity by raising the tax on dirty goods.

The opposite occurs

when leisure and amenity values are substitutes. In this case, increased leisure over
time facilitates substitution possibilities between leisure and amenity values, and the
production value of resources rises more quickly than resource amenity values. The
Ramsey planner responds by guiding environmental resources towards production by
lowering the tax on dirty goods over time.
Put Figures 1a and 1b here.
Figure 1b indicates an outcome for the tax on the clean good that mirrors that of
the dirty good tax. This outcome reﬂects the planner’s need to raise a constant share
of output as tax revenue so that, in general, taxes on clean goods decline (increase)
with larger (smaller) taxes on dirty goods. Because of this connection between the
two tax rates, in Figures 2 and 3 we consider only the dynamic pattern of taxes on
dirty goods and allow the tax on clean goods to remain implicit.
It is also possible to evaluate what is happening to other variables in the equilib
rium. We now present some of this analysis without ﬁgures as the results are mostly
intuitive.

Furthermore, since this analysis moves us away from the tax analysis,

which is the main focus of the paper, we only present them here for the alternative σ
value cases and leave them implicit in the other cases considered below. Regardless
of the elasticity parameters, the production, and thus the consumption, of both the
dirty and clean goods increase over time as the level of technology increases.

Be

cause the dirty good has a factor of production which is limited, dirty output and
consumption growth is somewhat slower than clean output and consumption growth.
Because of the relative scarcity of the dirty good, its price relative to the clean good
is always increasing over time.

Furthermore, for most elasticity values, the price

increase of the dirty good is suﬃciently fast that the share of consumer expenditures
on dirty goods actually increases over time.
Figure 2 depicts the dynamic optimal tax proﬁle for variations in the elasticity
of substitution between consumption of dirty goods and clean goods, ψ. For more
substitutable values of ψ, the optimal tax on dirty goods rises over time, and the
tax increases at a faster pace as substitutability gets higher. Under circumstances
in which clean goods can be readily substituted for dirty goods in utility, the cost
of allocating environmental resources to dirty good production rises because of the
relatively faster increase in the ability to produce clean goods. The Ramsey planner
responds by encouraging fewer dirty goods by raising taxes on them. On the other
hand, when consumption goods are highly complementary, the opposite occurs: taxes
on the dirty good fall over time. This is because the utility value of dirty goods rises
faster than the amenity value as economic growth increases consumption of clean
goods. This means the planner reduces taxes on dirty goods over time to redirect
resources into dirty good production.

Put Figures 2 and 3 here.
Figure 3 shows the optimal tax path for incremental changes in the elasticity
of substitution between the consumption good aggregate, c, and the leisure-amenity
aggregate, b.

These ﬁgures exhibit similar characteristics as those in Figure 2,

although the tax on dirty goods is higher in all periods for greater values of the
substitution parameter between goods, ψ, than they are for greater values of θ. This
is because a higher degree of substitution arising from ψ values allows the tax to be
more focused on the dirty good than a higher degree of substitution arising from θ
does.

4.2

Substitutable utility arguments and non-monotonic policy

Here we show that optimal policy in both the dirty goods and clean goods sector
need not follow monotonic paths over time. We demonstrate this with simulations in

which dirty goods and clean goods are highly substitutable and vary the substitution
possibilities between leisure and amenity values.

These results are illustrated in

Figures 4a, 4b and 4c where the elasticity parameter θ was left at its baseline and ψ
was set to 0.7 to reﬂect a high level of substitutability while σ was allowed to range
from a complementary value of -0.9 to a substitutable value of 0.7. Figure 4a shows
a reversal in the tax on dirty goods occurs when σ = 0.7, which reﬂects a high level
of substitutability, while Figure 4b shows a reversal in the tax on clean goods occurs
when σ reﬂects a high degree of complementarity.10 For this discussion we will also
ﬁnd it useful to refer to Figure 4c which shows how much of the natural resources
are allocated to production.
Put Figures 4a, 4b and 4c here.
First consider the case where there is a reversal in the tax rate on dirty goods (i.e.
the σ = 0.7 case).

In early periods of a growing economy, resources are relatively

plentiful, where by relatively plentiful we mean that resources are in relatively greater
supply than the physical capital stock (i.e., d = 100 and k0 = 5).

Because of the

low initial capital stock and eﬀective labor supply levels, natural resources are not
very productive and because dirty goods and clean goods are close substitutes, the
best use of the resource for generating utility is in amenity as illustrated in Figure 4c.
To assist in allocating the natural resource toward amenity, optimal taxes on dirty
goods are kept relatively high. As the economy grows, the capital stock and eﬀective
labor supply grow and this pushes up the value of resources in dirty good production.
This rise in the value of resources in production is suﬃciently fast that resources shift
quickly into production and away from amenity. This movement away from amenity
increases the amenity externality and the Ramsey planner attempts to slow this real
location by raising taxes on dirty goods further. However, after a point, these taxes
reverse and start to fall. The point where taxes start to fall occurs approximately
10

It is also possible to have non-monotonic tax time paths opposite to these with a diﬀerent set of
paramters. So for instance, it is possible to have dirty good taxes initially fall for a period of time
and after a while turn and then start rising. These cases are not presented here.

when natural resources might be described as becoming less abundant than the cap
ital stock (i.e. approximately when k passes d = 100). Alternatively, one might say
this turning point occurs when capital and eﬀective labor are in relatively greater
abundance than natural resources.

With this increase in the capital and eﬀective

labor inputs in production, resources become increasingly valued in production and
because of the high degree of substitutability between amenity and leisure the planner
ﬁnds it desirable to facilitate the movement of the natural resource into dirty good
production by lowering dirty good taxes and ﬁnancing expenditures increasingly on
taxes from clean goods as seen in Figure 4b.
Next consider the case where there is a reversal in the tax rate on clean goods
(e.g. the case where σ = −0.9 ). Figure 4b shows that the initial periods are marked
by a falling tax on clean goods which eventually reverse and starts to increase right
around the point where natural resources might be described as less abundant (i.e.
approximately when k becomes larger than d = 100).

To understand this case

intuitively, note that during the initial periods when natural resources are relatively
plentiful, resources are predominately allocated to production (See Figure 4c). This
is because the small σ reﬂects complementarity and thus it is best to have more
equal values of amenity and leisure in the early stages of development. Since eﬀective
leisure is small, because of the low technology level, amenity needs to be small as
well, so taxes on dirty goods are initially lower in this complementary case than in
the substitutable case described above.

As the capital stock and eﬀective labor

supply grow, resources are replaced in production by capital and labor and move into
amenity where they need to increase because of the complementarity with eﬀective
leisure which is growing with the rising technology level. To help guide this movement
of resources into amenity, Figure 4a shows the social planner raising taxes on dirty
goods which allows it to reduce taxes on clean goods for a while. As resources start
to become relatively less abundant (i.e. approximately when k becomes larger than
d = 100), the planner ﬁnds that it needs to continue increasing taxes on dirty goods
to further encourage resources into amenity where it is complementary to leisure.

However, because consumption goods are substitutable, the tax increases on dirty
goods slows their production enough that the planner ﬁnds that it needs to start
raising taxes on clean consumption goods so as to balance its budget constraint.

4.3

Application: Community development patterns

In the United States, local government policies often exhibit non-monotonic behavior
toward development over time. In particular, it is not uncommon for local govern
ments to adopt a pro-growth position at early stages of community development in
which building permits are easily obtained and tax incentives are provided to attract
businesses. This high growth period is then sometimes followed by a slow growth,
or in some extreme cases a no growth period, in which building permits are more
diﬃcult to obtain, which is then followed by a reopening of development to moderate
growth in which building permits become somewhat easier to obtain than the recent
past. It is useful to emphasize, that this non-monotonic policy is only observed in
some communities. However, in those that it is observed, an interesting question is
whether such an observation could be the result of an optimal policy maker.
The non-monotonic pattern of local community development described above is
consistent with the illustration in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c in which ψ = 0.7 and
σ = 0.7.11 In the early “development phase”, which corresponds to low capital values
in the ﬁgures above, taxes are low on the natural resource based good (development),
where we interpret the tax as the local development impact fee on new construction
and the dirty good as homes built on undeveloped land. This initial period is then
followed by one in which development impact fees rise, which is reﬂected by the high
tax rate on the dirty good. Finally, this slow growth policy stance gives way to a
more moderate growth policy stance in which development becomes somewhat less
costly, as reﬂected by the lower tax rate on the dirty good. In interpreting our model
in this way, it is important to note that although the model shows that the policy
variable can exhibit a non-monotonic pattern, the actual use of land for amenity, as
11

Here we focus on the case in which growth only slows in the middle period rather than being
fully choked oﬀ to the point of no growth.

well as production of the dirty good, is monotonic in a way that shows a continuously
decreasing percentage of land being used for amenity and a continuously increasing
percentage of land being used for housing.
Furthermore, our model provides insight into which types of communities expe
rience monotonic behavior as a result of optimal policy and which do not. Holding
ψ = 0.7, we see that communities with somewhat lower elasticities of substitution
between amenity and leisure, for instance σ = 0.3, are likely to experience monotonic
behavior while those with higher elasticities, such as σ = 0.7, do not. Put diﬀerently,
the more willing a community is to trade oﬀ amenity values and leisure, the more
likely there will be non-monotonic building permit policy for development.

5

Conclusion

This paper investigated the dynamic tax policy decisions of a Ramsey planner who
designs policy to allocate an environmental resource between alternative uses in the
production of goods and the production of amenity values in a growing economy with
a rich set of consumer utility arguments. The analysis reveals that elasticities of sub
stitution between consumer utility arguments impact the dynamic behavior of optimal
tax policy. The substitution elasticities between environmental resource amenity and
leisure and between dirty goods and clean goods have the most pronounced impact
on the dynamic policy proﬁle. The reason for this is that as the economy grows, the
marginal valuation of the various utility arguments are impacted unequally. Under
circumstances where amenity value is complementary with leisure, growth in leisure
increases demand for environmental resource amenities, and the optimal policy ad
justs by increasing taxes on dirty goods over time to steer resources towards the
production of amenity values. Conversely, when amenity values and leisure are sub
stitutes, growth in eﬀective leisure over time causes consumers to substitute away
from amenity values in utility, and the optimal tax proﬁle involves declining taxes on
dirty goods over time. Under circumstances where dirty goods and clean goods are
substitutes, taxes on dirty goods increase over time with the growth in capital being

allocated increasingly to clean production techniques, as consumers are better able
to replace dirty good consumption with consumption of clean goods.
One interesting outcome occurs when there is a high degree of substitution be
tween amenity value and leisure and between dirty and clean goods.

In this case,

taxes on dirty goods may rise for a period of time to capitalize on the ability for dirty
goods to substitute for clean goods, but then to subsequently fall as the growth in
leisure facilitates substitution away from amenity values in utility. This complexity
of the dynamic optimal tax problem highlights the need to carefully understand the
relationship between environmental values and clean goods in consumer utility func
tions. Understanding this relationship is particularly important for environmental
resources that have dual uses. Moreover, these results show that environmental pol
icy need not be generic, but instead should reﬂect the individual aspect of amenities
provided by a particular environmental resource. For instance, forest resources may
be characterized by more complete property rights than ﬁshery resources, but also
provide a greater degree of complementarity with leisure. Optimal dynamic policies
on forest and ﬁshery resources should reﬂect these diﬀerences.
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Figure 1b: Baseline parameters
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Figure 2: Baseline parameters
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Figure 3: Baseline parameters
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Figure 4a: Baseline parameters except for psi=0.7

Figure 4b: Baseline parameters except for psi=0.7
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Figure 4c: Baseline parameters except for psi=0.7
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